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ARGUMENT 
L SFA 1 WAS NOT BINDING ON JOHNSON. 
A. Johnson Did Not Accept the Terms of SFA 1 as Required by Its Express 
Terms. 
The Wilsons contend that SFA 1 is binding on Johnson because "though a contract 
consists of multiple pages, not every page needs to be signed to be included in the 
ultimate agreement." Wilson's Brief at 8. While that may be true for some contracts, it 
is not true in this case, because the terms of the Seller Financing Addendum ("SFA 1") 
offered by the Wilsons to Johnson as part of the original Real Estate Purchase Contract 
(the "REPC") require Johnson's signature. In offering SFA 1 to Johnson, the Wilsons 
expressly stated the terms upon which SFA 1 would become part of the REPC, (i) it had 
to be signed by Johnson and (ii) Johnson or her agent had to communicate to the Wilsons 
or their agent that SFA 1 had been signed. It is undisputed that neither of those express 
conditions, set by the Wilsons, was satisfied. 
The Wilsons point to no cases where an unsigned addendum is "integrated" into a 
contract when the addendum expressly states that it must be signed in order to be binding 
on the parties. The language in the REPC "incorporating" SFA 1 can only be applicable 
if the express conditions for that incorporation - acceptance of SFA 1 by Johnson 
according to the terms set forth in SFA 1 - were met. Likewise, Johnson's counteroffer 
in Addendum No. 2 referencing prior "addenda" again refers to accepted addenda. The 
Wilsons' argument and District Court opinion turn a basic principal of contract law - that 
1 
the express terms of a contract control over terms proposed but not agreed to - on its 
head. If the Wilsons intended SFA 1 to be automatically "integrated" into the final 
REPC, they would not have expressly stated specific requirements for its acceptance and 
integration.1 
B. The Wilsons' Offer of SFA 2 Demonstrates That They Understood Johnson 
Had Not Accepted SFA 1. 
The Wilsons contend that the second seller financing addendum, which they sent 
to Johnson on February 8, 2007, one month after SFA 1 was delivered, "was only drawn 
up upon Johnson's agent asking for a new document that specified the amounts of 
principal, tax, and insurance in escrow." Wilsons' Brief at 6 n. 1. Contrary to the 
Wilsons' assertion, as pointed out in Johnson's opening brief, SFA 1 and SFA 2 stated 
different monthly payment amounts - monthly payments of $5,250.00 in the case of SFA 
1 as compared to $5,493.02 in the case of SFA 2. This is not mere "supplementation" - it 
is a material difference in the two different offers for seller financing. The Wilsons' 
conveyance of the offer in SFA 2 demonstrates that they understood Johnson had not 
accepted SFA 1 particularly because SFA 2 increased the amount of the monthly 
payment. If Johnson had already accepted SFA 1, it would make no sense for the 
Wilsons to voluntarily increase the monthly payment amount as they proposed in SFA 2. 
The District Court's finding that SFA 1 was binding on Johnson was in error and should 
be reversed. 
1
 Contrary to the Wilsons' assertions, Johnson did express, through her agent, that SFA 1 
was not acceptable to her. R. at 274. 
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II. THE WILSONS BREACHED THE REPC BY FAILING TO 
TENDER A PROMISSORY NOTE FOR SELLER FINANCING 
CONSISTENT WITH SFA 1. 
After strenuously arguing that SFA 1 is binding on the parties, the Wilsons 
contend that the Court should ignore its terms and find that the Wilsons did not breach 
SFA 1 even though they never executed or tendered a promissory note and trust deed in 
the amounts specified by SFA 1 at the time set for closing. The Wilsons contend that 
"[s]ince Johnson demanded a higher purchase price in her counteroffer . . . it is only 
sensible to assume that the intent would be for the amount of the promissory note and 
trust deed to increase as well." Wilsons' Brief at 12. Contrary to the Wilsons' 
contention, that is not a reasonable assumption. As this Court found in Dunn v. Prichard, 
where there is a lack of detail "concerning the seller financing in the agreement . . . such 
uncertainty does not invalidate a contract. Rather, a requirement of full cash payment at 
closing will be implied." Dunn v. Prichard, 2001 UT App 252, * 1 n. 1 (citing Reed v. 
Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1378-79 (Utah 1980)) (emphasis added) (unpublished opinion); 
see also Reed, 610 P.2d at 1378-79 (in interpreting a contract for the purchase of real 
property for $70,000.00 upon "terms to be arranged," Utah Supreme Court found that 
"[w]here there is no agreement concerning the terms of payment this Court will alleviate 
the uncertainty of this aspect of the contract by requiring full payment at the time of the 
tender of the conveyance"). 
The Wilsons try to distinguish Reed- in arguing that $50,000.00 payment "gap" 
in the REPC should be split proportionality between the Wilsons and Johnson - on the 
3 
grounds that "in the instant case there were specific terms of payment in the agreement" 
and "the parties intended to proportionality increase Wilsons' down payment and the 
amount Johnson would seller finance based upon the increase in price." Wilsons' Brief 
at 14-15. There is no evidence in the record of such an intent other than the Wilsons' 
unexpressed intent regarding their interpretation of the REPC and SFA 1. Nothing in the 
drafts or executed documents constituting the REPC and its executed addenda even hint 
that the parties' agreement was for a 90-10 split (with the Wilsons paying 10 percent 
down and Johnson financing 90 percent of the purchase price), as opposed to the express 
and stated amounts of seller financing contained in the REPC and SFA 1. The Wilsons 
point to no case adopting their "proportionate" increase in seller financing theory. 
The only cases addressing the issue of a contract that does not specify the terms of 
seller financing are Reed and Dunn. Each of those cases stands for the proposition that 
where a contract is not clear on seller financing terms, the contract itself is still valid but 
the buyer carries the burden and must pay the full purchase price at closing. This 
doctrine - recognized by both the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals - is 
eminently more reasonable than the theory argued by the Wilsons. If a buyer wishes to 
impose on a seller the risk of seller financing in a real estate transaction, it is incumbent 
on the buyer to make that expectation clear. The District Court's opinion, holding that 
the Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA 1 even though they never tendered a 
promissory note and trust deed in the amounts specified for seller financing, is in error 
and should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the District Court's entry of summary judgment in favor 
of the Wilsons because it erred in concluding that (i) SFA 1 was binding on Johnson even 
though she never signed it in the manner specified by the REPC for it to be accepted and 
(ii) the Wilsons did not breach the REPC and SFA 1 when they failed to tender a 
promissory note and trust deed for seller financing in the amounts specified in SFA 1. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 2009. 
BENNETT TUELLER JOHNSON & DEERE 
Andrew V. Collins 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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